relay-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
ghandgitCLI tools to manage pull requests, fetch diffs, and interact with repository metadata. These operations are performed via Node.jsexecFileSyncwith appropriately scoped arguments and are core to the skill's intended purpose. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Pull request diffs, issue descriptions, and PR body content are fetched from GitHub via the
ghCLI (a well-known service). This data is processed as the primary input for the code review. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies a potential indirect prompt injection surface and implements specific defenses:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
gh pr diff,gh issue view, andgh pr viewoutput (referenced inscripts/review-runner/context.jsandscripts/review-runner.js). - Boundary markers: The
references/reviewer-prompt.mdfile defines a strict 'Content boundary rule' using<task-content>tags to delimit external data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for command execution (
gh,git), local file system writes (~/.relay/runs/), and network operations via the GitHub API. - Sanitization: The model is explicitly instructed to disregard any instructions or directives (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions') found within the boundary-marked data segments.
- [SAFE]: A security monitor in
scripts/review-runner/reviewer-invoke.jsperforms a runtime check for unexpected file system modifications after a reviewer round completes. If changes are detected, it flags a policy violation and escalates the manifest, providing a safeguard against unauthorized code changes by the AI model.
Audit Metadata