autobrowse-agent-browser
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The harness script
scripts/evaluate.mjsusesexecFileSyncto run shell commands. By default, it invokesnpx acpxwith the--approve-allflag, which grants the delegated AI agent full permission to execute arbitrary commands in the local shell environment without manual oversight.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill setup requires downloading external dependencies from the NPM registry, specifically theacpxandagent-browserpackages. Additionally,agent-browser installtriggers the download of browser runtimes (e.g., Chromium) from remote servers.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Theevaluate.mjsscript facilitates the execution of code via a delegated agent model throughacpx exec. This execution environment is dynamic and influenced by a prompt that incorporates content from external websites and local task configuration files.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of processing untrusted web data with a high-privilege agent.\n - Ingestion points:
task.md,strategy.md, and live web content accessed viaagent-browser.\n - Boundary markers: The prompt in
evaluate.mjsuses Markdown headers to separate instructions from data but lacks explicit negative constraints to ignore instructions embedded in the ingested content.\n - Capability inventory: The delegated agent can execute shell commands via
acpx, write local files for traces/screenshots, and perform network requests viaagent-browser.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering for the data fetched from the web before it is presented to the agent.
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