autobrowse-agent-browser

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The harness script scripts/evaluate.mjs uses execFileSync to run shell commands. By default, it invokes npx acpx with the --approve-all flag, which grants the delegated AI agent full permission to execute arbitrary commands in the local shell environment without manual oversight.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill setup requires downloading external dependencies from the NPM registry, specifically the acpx and agent-browser packages. Additionally, agent-browser install triggers the download of browser runtimes (e.g., Chromium) from remote servers.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The evaluate.mjs script facilitates the execution of code via a delegated agent model through acpx exec. This execution environment is dynamic and influenced by a prompt that incorporates content from external websites and local task configuration files.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of processing untrusted web data with a high-privilege agent.\n
  • Ingestion points: task.md, strategy.md, and live web content accessed via agent-browser.\n
  • Boundary markers: The prompt in evaluate.mjs uses Markdown headers to separate instructions from data but lacks explicit negative constraints to ignore instructions embedded in the ingested content.\n
  • Capability inventory: The delegated agent can execute shell commands via acpx, write local files for traces/screenshots, and perform network requests via agent-browser.\n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering for the data fetched from the web before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 12, 2026, 10:43 AM