discord-awaken-claw
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md direct the agent to execute shell commands using
curlandnode -e. These commands interpolate variables like{imageUrl}and{charData.character}directly into the execution string. Since these values can originate from user input or external APIs (Wikipedia/Neta), they present a significant surface for command injection if not strictly validated. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
node -eto execute a dynamically assembled JavaScript snippet at runtime for updating the Discord avatar. This practice of generating and executing code from string templates is a high-risk pattern that can be exploited if the source data is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input describing character traits and interpolates it directly into system prompts for character identification and tone generation.
- Ingestion points: User-provided descriptions in Step 2 of the workflow.
- Boundary markers: Missing; input is concatenated into the prompt string without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess calls (curl, node), file writing (SOUL.md), and profile modification.
- Sanitization: Minimal sanitization is performed (regex replacement of mentions), which is insufficient to prevent indirect prompt injection.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches character data and media from external sources, including Wikipedia, Wikimedia Commons, and the vendor-specific Neta API. It also requires the global installation of the
@talesofai/neta-skillspackage. While these sources are associated with the vendor or well-known services, the automated fetching of content for use in shell commands and dynamic execution remains a risk factor.
Audit Metadata