research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from GitHub issues using the
gh issue viewtool. - Ingestion points: External issue content retrieved from GitHub via the
ghCLI (Step 2 and 3). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to isolate the untrusted issue text from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write,Read,Glob,Grep, and theAgenttool for spawning sub-agents. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the ingested issue content before it is processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to interact with the GitHub CLI (gh issue view,gh pr list). - The issue identifier supplied in
$ARGUMENTSis passed to shell commands. If the platform does not strictly sanitize these arguments, it could present a command injection surface. - The skill contains a specific security-conscious constraint: it explicitly instructs sub-agents to avoid using
grep -rorfindto prevent the traversal of sensitive files like.secret.localwhich are governed by deny-list rules.
Audit Metadata