pua-loop
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly overrides agent safety constraints by forbidding the use of
AskUserQuestionand preventing the agent from reporting that a task cannot be solved. This removes the 'human-in-the-loop' requirement for sensitive or complex operations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands including
bash,sed, andcatto create and modify files in the.claude/directory. This is used to persist state and behavior across multiple autonomous iterations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes an external shell script (
setup-pua-loop.sh) located in the plugin root to initialize the autonomous loop environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The autonomous nature of the loop, combined with instructions to 'scan similar problems' and 'fix bugs,' creates a risk where the agent may access sensitive local files (such as
.envor configuration files) and process their contents without user consent or visibility. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill adopts a high-pressure 'PUA' persona designed to coerce the model into performing tasks it might otherwise refuse, using a 'pressure upgrade' ladder to bypass model guardrails.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface as it iteratively reads from and writes to the
.claude/pua-loop.local.mdfile. Ingestion points:.claude/pua-loop.local.mdand.claude/pua-loop-context.md; Boundary markers: Absent; Capability inventory: Shell execution (bash,sed,cat) and file system writes across scripts; Sanitization: Absent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata