dingtalk-teambition
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to retrieve and process user-generated content from the Teambition API, which serves as a potential vector for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Scripts such as
query_tasks.py,query_task_detail.py,query_task_activity.py, andrender_rtf.pyingest external data including task titles, notes, and comments. - Boundary markers: While
SKILL.mdprovides detailed formatting and display rules, it lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions potentially embedded within the retrieved task data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations (API requests to Teambition) and file uploads to the vendor's storage infrastructure via
upload_file.py. - Sanitization: The scripts process API responses into structured JSON or simplified text for the agent; however, the agent remains exposed to the raw text content of retrieved comments and task notes.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages sensitive data, including a
TEAMBITION_USER_TOKEN. All network operations are directed towards official vendor endpoints (open.teambition.com) or temporary presigned URLs provided by the official API for file uploads, which is a standard and expected behavior for this integration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages
uvandpython3to execute its internal scripts as defined in thepackage.jsonandREADME.md. No patterns suggesting the execution of arbitrary or unsanitized shell commands from untrusted inputs were identified.
Audit Metadata