svintl
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of multiple
npx intlshell commands to manage translations, build dictionaries, and configure project settings. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes
npxto fetch and execute a package namedintlfrom the public npm registry. The use of a highly generic package name increases the risk of executing unintended or malicious code if a name collision occurs or if a malicious package shadows the intended tool. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill supports dynamic code generation through the
npx intl buildcommand. This process generates executable JavaScript and TypeScript files (built.js,types.ts) from YAML source files. This includes the conversion of user-provided string templates and!jstagged functions into application code, creating a vector for code injection if source files are manipulated. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits project-specific data, including translation keys, values, and descriptive "context" strings, to OpenAI's external APIs for automated translation processing.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) as it processes external, potentially untrusted data that is used to influence LLM outputs.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the workflow via
npx intl add,set, andcontextcommands which store data in YAML files (e.g.,context.yaml). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions described to prevent malicious content within the translation strings from overriding the translation engine's behavior.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (
npx) and write generated code to the project directory. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation is provided for the input strings processed by the translation CLI.
Audit Metadata