skill-finder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's installation workflow defined in
references/installation-workflow.mdexplicitly automates the execution of arbitrary shell scripts (bash setup.sh) downloaded from unvetted third-party GitHub repositories found during search. This capability allows for the execution of unverified and potentially malicious code within the user's local environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The core functionality of the skill relies on fetching content and cloning repositories from unvetted third-party sources on GitHub using
gh apiandgh repo clonebased on user-supplied search queries. This architectural design encourages the downloading of unvetted executable content from the open internet. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates and automates high-risk system-level commands, including the use of package managers (
npm install,pip install -r requirements.txt) and shell script execution from discovered repositories. This bypasses standard manual vetting procedures for third-party software installation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is instructed to 'Actually READ' and semantically analyze untrusted
SKILL.mdcontent from external repositories to perform scoring and evaluation. - Ingestion points: Untrusted content from third-party GitHub repositories is fetched via API and processed locally (e.g., stored in
temp_skill.md) for semantic matching and quality assessment. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or safety directives to isolate the external content, increasing the risk that malicious instructions embedded within a discovered skill could override agent behavior during the evaluation phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment possesses extensive capabilities, including shell access (
gh,bash), network operations, and file system modification permissions. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external markdown files before they are processed by the agent's logic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata