bear-notes
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill metadata specifies an installation step that fetches the
grizzlyCLI tool directly from a personal GitHub repository (github.com/tylerwince/grizzly/cmd/grizzly@latest) using the Go package manager. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the
grizzlybinary to perform all operations, including creating notes, reading notes, and managing tags. This involves shell execution of subcommands likeopen-note,create, andadd-text. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill handles sensitive authentication tokens for the Bear app. It instructs the user to store their API token in a plain-text file at
~/.config/grizzly/tokenand references this file in command arguments (e.g.,--token-file ~/.config/grizzly/token). Accessing this path exposes the token to the agent context. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the
grizzly open-note,grizzly tags, andgrizzly open-tagcommands, which return content from the user's Bear notes. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing note content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write data back to the file system or modify notes via
grizzly createandgrizzly add-text. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved note content is performed before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata