gdrive-access
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill retrieves sensitive OAuth client credentials (client ID and secret) from a 1Password vault using the
opcommand-line tool. Although this is a managed authentication flow, it involves the agent handling high-privilege secrets that are subsequently stored as tokens in~/.claude/tools/gdrive-tokens/with restrictive permissions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The build and setup instructions in
SKILL.mdrequire runningbun install, which downloads the@googleapis/drivelibrary and various development tools from the npm registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several automated shell operations, including compiling its own source code into a binary using
bun build, interacting with the 1Password CLI to fetch secrets, and spawning a local HTTP server (Bun.serve) to receive OAuth authorization codes. It also executes its own built binary for all Google Drive operations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a 'Self-Evolving Skill' directive that instructs the AI agent to modify its own instructions based on its operational experiences. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. Ingestion points: Data and metadata read from external Google Drive files via thegdrive listandsearchcommands. Boundary markers: None; external content is processed directly by the agent. Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to write to its ownSKILL.mdand execute arbitrary shell commands. Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on file content before it is interpreted by the agent, potentially allowing malicious files to trigger permanent changes to the skill's behavior.
Audit Metadata