gdrive-access

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill retrieves sensitive OAuth client credentials (client ID and secret) from a 1Password vault using the op command-line tool. Although this is a managed authentication flow, it involves the agent handling high-privilege secrets that are subsequently stored as tokens in ~/.claude/tools/gdrive-tokens/ with restrictive permissions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The build and setup instructions in SKILL.md require running bun install, which downloads the @googleapis/drive library and various development tools from the npm registry.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several automated shell operations, including compiling its own source code into a binary using bun build, interacting with the 1Password CLI to fetch secrets, and spawning a local HTTP server (Bun.serve) to receive OAuth authorization codes. It also executes its own built binary for all Google Drive operations.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file contains a 'Self-Evolving Skill' directive that instructs the AI agent to modify its own instructions based on its operational experiences. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. Ingestion points: Data and metadata read from external Google Drive files via the gdrive list and search commands. Boundary markers: None; external content is processed directly by the agent. Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to write to its own SKILL.md and execute arbitrary shell commands. Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on file content before it is interpreted by the agent, potentially allowing malicious files to trigger permanent changes to the skill's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 13, 2026, 07:16 PM