gmail-access

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external email data, which represents a significant surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The skill utilizes the gmail read, gmail search, and gmail export commands to ingest email bodies, subjects, and attachments from external senders directly into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: The skill implements a detailed 'Attribution Doctrine' and a dedicated script (scripts/attribution-parse.ts) to programmatically separate sender text from agent responses. It further enforces the use of blockquote styling (> ) and verbatim quoting to maintain clear boundaries.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool (allowing shell command execution), the Write tool (allowing file system modifications), and the AskUserQuestion tool.
  • Sanitization: Documentation mentions gmail-send-guard.ts and gmail-body-guard.ts which are intended to block raw email sends and detect/prevent markdown or mid-sentence line break injection in drafts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operation relies heavily on the execution of local shell commands and scripts. It directs the agent to build the primary Gmail CLI tool using bun run build and execute various utility scripts such as gmail-accounts.ts and gmail-draft.ts to manage accounts and correspondence.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages Gmail OAuth tokens and application credentials. It follows security best practices by using the 1Password CLI (op) to fetch secrets and storing local tokens with restricted file permissions (chmod 600) in ~/.claude/tools/gmail-tokens/.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 7, 2026, 02:12 AM