sfd-video-director
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
vidlangframework and its linting tool (vidlang/lint.ts) use dynamicimport()to load and execute TypeScript or JavaScript configuration and specification files from computed paths on the filesystem. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several automation scripts, including
scripts/generate-multi-scene.tsandscripts/generate-lofi-b-roll.ts, useBun.$to execute shell commands likeffmpegandffprobe. These commands use arguments derived from user-provided configuration files to perform media concatenation, normalization, and editing. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Video specifications, prompts, and dialogue read from
scenes.jsonorcharacter.jsonfiles. - Boundary markers: Absent; user-provided text content is interpolated directly into API payloads without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
Bun.$and network operations viafetchacross multiple scripts. - Sanitization: Absent; ingested text is not validated or escaped before being transmitted to external AI models.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches assets from external sources, including a hardcoded image reference on
tempfile.aiquickdraw.cominscripts/generate-multi-scene.tsand dynamic media URLs from AI service providers.
Audit Metadata