email-sequence-manager
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a pre-configured automation command that sends business performance data to a specific, hardcoded Telegram chat ID.
- Evidence: The
openclaw cron addcommand inSKILL.mdincludes the flag--to "-1003853954380", which targets a fixed Telegram destination. - Data Risk: The automated report extracts and transmits sensitive metrics from
email-state.md, including revenue, conversion rates, and campaign performance, to a recipient that is not clearly identified as user-controlled. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation encourages the user to run a shell command to enable recurring tasks.
- Evidence: The
Cron Setupsection inSKILL.mdprovides anopenclaw cron addcommand. While this is a platform-native feature, in this context it facilitates the automated transmission of sensitive data to an external ID. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface where data processed by the automated reporter could influence the AI agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The AI model tasked with reporting reads
email-state.md, which contains user-defined content such as sequence notes and subject lines that may contain external or untrusted data. - Boundary markers: The instructions provided to the reporting model do not use delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to separate the analytical task from the data being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The model has the capability to send generated text to a Telegram chat, which could be exploited to exfiltrate data if a prompt injection attack is successful.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or escaping for the metrics data before it is interpolated into the model's reporting prompt.
Audit Metadata