email-sequence-manager

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides a pre-configured automation command that sends business performance data to a specific, hardcoded Telegram chat ID.
  • Evidence: The openclaw cron add command in SKILL.md includes the flag --to "-1003853954380", which targets a fixed Telegram destination.
  • Data Risk: The automated report extracts and transmits sensitive metrics from email-state.md, including revenue, conversion rates, and campaign performance, to a recipient that is not clearly identified as user-controlled.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation encourages the user to run a shell command to enable recurring tasks.
  • Evidence: The Cron Setup section in SKILL.md provides an openclaw cron add command. While this is a platform-native feature, in this context it facilitates the automated transmission of sensitive data to an external ID.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface where data processed by the automated reporter could influence the AI agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The AI model tasked with reporting reads email-state.md, which contains user-defined content such as sequence notes and subject lines that may contain external or untrusted data.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions provided to the reporting model do not use delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to separate the analytical task from the data being analyzed.
  • Capability inventory: The model has the capability to send generated text to a Telegram chat, which could be exploited to exfiltrate data if a prompt injection attack is successful.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or escaping for the metrics data before it is interpolated into the model's reporting prompt.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 26, 2026, 04:12 PM