biorxiv-database

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches preprint metadata and PDFs from bioRxiv's official API and website.\n
  • Evidence: Requests are made to api.biorxiv.org and www.biorxiv.org in scripts/biorxiv_search.py.\n
  • Note: These are well-known services for the life sciences community.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted text from external sources, making it susceptible to indirect prompt injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: Preprint titles and abstracts are retrieved via the BioRxivSearcher class in scripts/biorxiv_search.py.\n
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not use delimiters or warnings to isolate retrieved content from the agent's instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write search results and PDFs to the file system using the --output and --download-pdf flags across multiple Python methods.\n
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the retrieved text is performed before it is output to the user or agent context.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python script writes data to file paths provided as command-line arguments without validation.\n
  • Evidence: In scripts/biorxiv_search.py, args.output and args.download_pdf are passed directly to the open() function for writing.\n
  • Impact: This could allow an agent to be manipulated into overwriting files if sensitive paths (e.g., shell profiles or configuration files) are provided by the model or user.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 29, 2026, 02:23 AM