matchms

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill promotes the use of load_from_pickle and save_as_pickle for handling preprocessed spectra. The Python pickle module is insecure because it can execute arbitrary code during the deserialization of data. This poses a risk if the agent or user loads a malicious pickle file provided by an untrusted source.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes external scientific services for data retrieval and annotation. The derive_annotation_from_compound_name filter fetches chemical identifiers from PubChem, and the load_from_usi function retrieves spectral data from GNPS and other Universal Spectrum Identifier repositories. These are well-known scientific services.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes several exporting functions such as save_as_mgf, save_as_msp, and save_as_json. These functions allow the agent to write processed spectral data and metadata to the local file system, which could be misused to write data to unauthorized locations.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes complex, externally-sourced spectral data which is then used to derive metadata and chemical annotations.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from multiple file formats (mzML, MGF, MSP, JSON) and remote USI strings via matchms.importing.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded content are used during data ingestion.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities through the matchms.exporting module and network access via chemical annotation filters.
  • Sanitization: Metadata harmonization filters are present, but they are designed for data standardization rather than security sanitization against malicious inputs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 29, 2026, 02:23 AM