research-brainstorm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources, including literature search results and user-provided documents such as CVs or project directories. These external inputs represent a surface for indirect prompt injection where adversarial content could attempt to influence the agent's logic.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data in Phase 2 (user documents/directories), Phase 4 (external search results from academic repositories), and Phase 8 (outputs from the
find-dataskill). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings when processing these external inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the authority to write markdown files to the local working directory (Phase 9) and invoke the
find-dataskill (Phase 8). - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for sanitizing or escaping retrieved content before incorporating it into the final research brief or ongoing dialogue.
Audit Metadata