research-yt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes several external CLI tools, including
yt-dlp,ffmpeg,whisper, andpandoc, through Python'ssubprocess.runand agent-led shell instructions. The Python implementations inscripts/check_deps.py,scripts/fetch_transcripts.py,scripts/list_channel.py, andscripts/render_pdf.pycorrectly pass arguments as lists (e.g.,subprocess.run(['tool', 'arg1', ...])), which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface because the agent is instructed to read and synthesize content from external YouTube transcripts during Step 5. Maliciously crafted subtitles could attempt to influence the agent's synthesis logic or behavior.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts are fetched from YouTube by
scripts/fetch_transcripts.pyand stored as Markdown files in the.research-yt/workspace. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly require the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when the agent reads the retrieved transcript files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file system access, network access (via yt-dlp), and command execution capabilities (via scripts).
- Sanitization: The
parse_vttfunction inscripts/fetch_transcripts.pystrips timecodes and HTML-like tags from transcripts but does not filter the natural language content for malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata