next-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The file
prototypes/cloud/src/shared.tscontains a hardcoded absolute path to a sensitive environment file (.env.local) located in a specific developer's workspace (/Users/judegao/workspace/repo/agent-eval/.env.local). The associatedloadEnvfunction attempts to read and inject these secrets into the process environment.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements anevalcommand insrc/cli.tsandsrc/daemon.tsthat allows the AI agent to execute arbitrary JavaScript code within the browser context viapage.evaluate. It also spawns a background daemon process usingnode.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Thenetworkcommand insrc/network.tsandsrc/cli.tsenables the agent to inspect detailed request and response data, including sensitive headers likeAuthorizationandCookie, which could be misused to harvest session tokens or credentials from the dev server traffic.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Instructions inSKILL.mddirect the agent to perform global package installations (npm install -g @vercel/next-browser) and download browser binaries (playwright install chromium). These operations target well-known registries and vendors.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from web pages, logs, and network traffic without sanitization while maintaining powerful browser automation capabilities. Ingestion points:src/network.ts(response bodies),src/suspense.ts(suspender descriptions). Boundary markers: Absent. Capability inventory: browser-levelevaluate, processspawn, and cookie management. Sanitization: Absent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata