call-codex
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
codexCLI with the--full-autoflag, which grants the secondary process the ability to write to the workspace without user confirmation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads local source code and transmits it to an external AI model for processing. While this is the intended purpose, it involves sending potentially sensitive data to a remote service.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on an external third-party binary (
codex) and suggests installation throughbrew, introducing a dependency on software from an external source. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by interpolating untrusted file content into a prompt for a secondary AI agent.
- Ingestion points: File contents are read from the local system (e.g.,
utils.py) and placed into the prompt template inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown code blocks as delimiters but depends primarily on a natural language instruction ("Do NOT modify any files...") to prevent the secondary agent from taking harmful actions.
- Capability inventory: The
codextool is configured with workspace-write permissions inSKILL.md, making it capable of modifying the local environment if an injection succeeds. - Sanitization: There is no escaping or sanitization of the content being analyzed, allowing instructions within the code to potentially override instructions given to the secondary agent.
Audit Metadata