second-opinion
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install packages and extensions from untrusted third-party sources.
- It suggests installing global npm packages:
@openai/codexand@google/gemini-cli, which are not official packages from those organizations. - It directs the installation of extensions from an unverified GitHub organization:
https://github.com/gemini-cli-extensions/code-reviewandhttps://github.com/gemini-cli-extensions/security. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes complex shell commands involving piped data and external CLI tools.
- Use of
geminiwith the--yoloflag explicitly bypasses confirmation for tool execution, allowing the CLI to run any command requested by the remote model or its extensions. - Use of
codex execinvolves running external code locally, although it specifies a read-only sandbox. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The combination of the
--yoloflag and untrusted extensions facilitates Remote Code Execution (RCE). - If an external model (Gemini or Codex) or a malicious extension decides to execute a shell command as part of its 'review', the
--yoloflag ensures it happens without human or agent intervention. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary function involves reading sensitive local project data and sending it to external APIs.
- Project diffs, including uncommitted changes and tracked files, are collected and sent to OpenAI and Google servers.
- Optionally includes the contents of
CLAUDE.mdorAGENTS.md(project conventions) in the external transmission. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted project source code diffs and file contents are gathered via
git diffandReadtools (SKILL.md, references/codex-invocation.md). - Boundary markers: Uses
---delimiters to separate code from instructions, but lacks explicit directives to ignore instructions embedded within the code being reviewed. - Capability inventory: The
geminiCLI can execute arbitrary tool calls via extensions when run with the--yoloflag (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the diff content before it is passed to the LLM-powered CLI tools.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata