upstash-workflow-js
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents mechanisms for ingesting untrusted data through workflow payloads, webhooks, and real-time notification endpoints. While the documentation correctly suggests using Zod for schema validation, there is an inherent risk of indirect prompt injection when this data is passed to the AI agents described in
agents.md. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(InitialPayload),features/webhooks.md(webhook request body), andhow-to/realtime.md(event notification body). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the provided prompt construction examples.
- Capability inventory: The SDK provides
context.run(arbitrary logic),context.call(HTTP requests),context.api(direct LLM provider calls), andcontext.invoke(cross-workflow execution). - Sanitization: Examples include
zodfor structural validation, but lack patterns for sanitizing natural language content against adversarial instructions. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
agents.mddocumentation includes an implementation example for a math tool usingmathjs.evaluate(expression)on user-supplied strings. This pattern can lead to arbitrary code execution if the math environment is not properly sandboxed, as the function has access to a wide range of JavaScript capabilities. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions include standard installation of vendor-provided packages and tools, such as
@upstash/workflow,@upstash/workflow-agents, and the@upstash/qstash-cli. These are legitimate resources for the SDK's stated purpose.
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