upgrade-dependencies-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection via external documentation.
- Ingestion points: Step 4 in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to "inspect official changelogs, migration guides, or release notes" from primary sources. This involves fetching and processing data from external, third-party URLs. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or instructions to treat external data as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses high-privilege capabilities including file modification (Step 5), shell command execution (Step 7), and GitHub API interaction via
gh(Steps 6 and 8). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety-filtering applied to the external content before the agent interprets it to make code changes or create issues.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands defined within the target repository, which could lead to arbitrary code execution if the repository or its dependencies are malicious.
- Evidence: Step 7 in
SKILL.md("Verify aggressively") directs the agent to run project-specific verification commands such asnpm test,pytest,build, or documented CI entrypoints. These commands are typically defined inpackage.jsonor other configuration files that the skill is actively modifying. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npxto execute tools not necessarily present in the local environment. - Evidence: The
references/package-manager-playbook.mdfile recommends the commandnpx npm-check-updates -u --target latest. This command fetches and executes thenpm-check-updatespackage from the npm registry at runtime.
Audit Metadata