create-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically identifies and executes shell scripts from local configuration files (
.github/workflows/ci.yamland.gitlab-ci.yml). According toreferences/ci-checks.md, the agent is instructed to runrun:orscript:blocks "as-is", which could result in the execution of arbitrary commands if those configuration files are maliciously modified. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes
npxto executemarkdownlint-cli2andcspell. This command may download these packages from the public npm registry at runtime if they are not cached locally. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted data from repository files to drive its logic and command execution.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from
.github/workflows/ci.yaml,.gitlab-ci.yml, and.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.mdto determine local commands and PR structure. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit instructions embedded within these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, enabling it to perform git operations, execute PR CLI tools (gh,glab), and run arbitrary scripts translated from CI configurations. - Sanitization: None; the agent is directed to run scripts from the CI configuration files without prior validation or escaping.
Audit Metadata