cursor-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
cursor-agentcommand-line tool via a Bash shell. It dynamically constructs the command string by interpolating user-supplied input ($task) and parameters such asmodeandmodel. If the agent fails to properly escape shell metacharacters within these inputs, it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the external
cursor-agentCLI to be installed and authenticated on the user's machine. The documentation also suggests installing the skill itself vianpx, which involves fetching remote code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the output of
git diff(code content) and the verbatim output returned by thecursor-agentCLI. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the code being reviewed or the CLI's response.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bashwith the ability to rungitandcursor-agentcommands. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are defined for the ingested data before it is presented to the user or used to generate a summary.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes shell commands at runtime based on logic that parses user hints for model and mode selection, which is a form of dynamic script generation.
Audit Metadata