start-session
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is instructed to identify and immediately execute 'sync or pull' shell commands documented in the
CLAUDE.mdfile. This constitutes dynamic command execution based on external, potentially untrusted file content.\n - Evidence: Step 1 in
SKILL.mdexplicitly states: "If CLAUDE.md documents a sync or pull command (rsync, git pull, etc.), run it now."\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes project-specific files and task inboxes to guide agent behavior, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.\n - Ingestion points: The agent reads
CLAUDE.md(Steps 0, 2, 6),_agent-inbox/*.md(Step 5b), and follows paths for related repositories found in the project configuration.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to treat content from these external files as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute arbitrary shell commands (Step 1), perform network operations via
git pull(Step 5b), and navigate the file system usingcd(Step 5b).\n - Sanitization: Absent. Content from
CLAUDE.mdand the_agent-inbox/is parsed and used to influence the session orientation and execution plan without validation or escaping.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata