debug-mode
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent is instructed to read log files (
.log) generated by the application being debugged. If the application processes and logs untrusted data, an attacker could inject instructions meant to manipulate the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The agent reads logs using the
catcommand as specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety warnings are present; logs are processed directly as NDJSON.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment can execute shell commands via
execSync, perform local filesystem operations, and run a local network server. - Sanitization: None. The instructions encourage the agent to treat log content as objective evidence for debugging.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: A path traversal vulnerability exists in
scripts/debug_server.js. The/logendpoint accepts asessionIddirectly from the POST request body and uses it to construct a file path viapath.join(LOG_DIR, ...)without any sanitization. This allows a malicious application being debugged to write files outside the designated.debugdirectory by providing asessionIdwith directory traversal sequences (e.g.,../../). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing local Node.js scripts (
debug_server.js,debug_cleanup.js) that interact with the system's process table usinglsofandkill. While port numbers are currently parsed as integers, the execution of local servers that process external network input increases the attack surface of the agent's host. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the generation and injection of instrumentation code (JavaScript and Python) into the user's project. While this is the intended purpose, it involves the agent dynamically creating and executing (via the app) code that may be influenced by its analysis of the project.
Audit Metadata