ai-court
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, specifically user tasks in IM platforms and code diffs via GitHub webhooks as defined in
configs/feishu/agents/duchayuan.mdandconfigs/feishu/agents/silijian.md. - Ingestion points: User-provided task descriptions and automated code diffs from version control systems.
- Boundary markers: The agent instructions lack explicit delimiters or safety instructions to treat external data as untrusted, increasing the risk of the agent following instructions embedded within the data.
- Capability inventory: The 'silijian' agent has the capability to execute local node scripts (
node scripts/task-store.js) and send messages to external channels via themessagetool. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping mechanisms are specified for processing external inputs before they are used as arguments for script execution or communication tools.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell and node.js scripts to perform its core functions.
- Evidence: The
scripts/doctor.shscript is used to validate the installation by checking local file existence and parsing JSON content. Thesilijian.mdprompt instructs the agent to usenode scripts/task-store.jsto manage task states. These are intended behaviors but represent a capability surface that relies on the agent's internal logic for safe parameter handling.
Audit Metadata