auto-review-loop-minimax
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to access the sensitive platform configuration file
~/.claude/settings.jsonto retrieve theMINIMAX_API_KEY. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Local project context, including narrative documents and research results, is transmitted to the external API endpoint
https://api.minimax.io/v1/chat/completions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to bypass user oversight by performing file writes silently ("Do NOT ask the user for permission — just do it silently") if standard tools fail.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes
curlfor API communication and suggests usingBashfor managing remote experiment sessions viaSSHandscreen/tmux. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted project data and implements changes based on LLM responses without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Project narrative documents, memory files, and prior review documents are read during the initialization phase in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or isolation instructions are present to prevent embedded instructions in project files from being interpreted.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash,Write,Edit, andAgenttools, allowing for broad filesystem and system interaction. - Sanitization: No filtering or validation is performed on data retrieved from project files before it is used to prompt the reviewer or implement fixes.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata