exa-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct shell commands using strings parsed from user input and web-retrieved metadata. Specifically, Step 6 involves interpolating page titles and author names directly into a
python3execution. If an attacker controls the metadata of a searched website, they could inject shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It ingests untrusted data (highlights, summaries, and full text) from the open web (Step 4) and provides it to the agent.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md Step 4 and Step 6 (metadata extraction).
- Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded in the search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(*),Read, andWritetools (SKILL.md frontmatter). - Sanitization: Absent. Web-retrieved content is used verbatim.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
exa-pypackage from the standard Python registry. This is the official SDK for Exa AI, a well-known service.
Audit Metadata