idea-discovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted data from several sources, including user-provided research briefs (RESEARCH_BRIEF.md), command-line arguments, and external research paper content/metadata fetched from arXiv. This data is used as primary context for automated reasoning phases, which could allow maliciously crafted content within a research paper or brief to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Processes content from
RESEARCH_BRIEF.md,$ARGUMENTS, and external data fetched via the/arxivand/research-littools. - Boundary markers: The workflow uses Markdown sections and headers to organize data, but it does not employ explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the external research content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute subprocesses (via
python3), perform network requests to research repositories, and write files to the project directory. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before it is interpolated into prompts for sub-skills.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes local Python scripts (
run_state.py,idea_discovery_gate.py,reviewer_route.py) viapython3to handle state persistence and evidence validation. It also utilizes shell commands (cat << 'EOF') as a fallback mechanism for writing large files to the filesystem.
Audit Metadata