The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and processes it using a reasoning model without sanitization.
Ingestion points: Phase B uses WebSearch and WebFetch to retrieve abstracts and technical claims from the public web (arXiv, Google Scholar, etc.).
Boundary markers: The instructions in Phase C interpolate this external content directly into the prompt for the REVIEWER_MODEL without using delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore potential commands embedded in the abstracts.
Capability inventory: The skill allows access to powerful tools like mcp__codex__codex and file system tools (Grep, Read, Glob), which an injected instruction could attempt to abuse.
Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping external content before it is passed to the reasoning model.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute a shell script located at tools/save_trace.sh. Since this script is not part of the skill's source files, its behavior is unverifiable and could execute arbitrary or malicious commands on the host system.
[DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'Review Tracing' section instructs the agent to write files to a hidden directory (.aris/traces/). This mechanism, while described as logging, could be used to harvest information from the agent's session and persist it in a non-standard location on the file system.

novelty-check