result-to-claim

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses bash to perform complex operations, including retrieving logs from a remote server using SSH and processing configuration files with awk.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Training logs and experiment metrics are gathered from multiple sources and sent to a secondary agent (gpt-6-astra). This constitutes exposure of potentially sensitive research data to an external model.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from experiment logs and W&B history, interpolating it directly into a prompt for a secondary LLM.
  • Ingestion points: Reads metrics from W&B API, local log files (EXPERIMENT_LOG.md), and remote server logs via SSH.
  • Boundary markers: Uses simple headers in the prompt template but lacks explicit instructions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to bash, file writing, and network tools (via SSH).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the experiment data before it is sent to the evaluator agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill determines the location of auxiliary scripts (evidence_check.py and research_wiki.py) at runtime by inspecting environment variables (ARIS_REPO) and local configuration files (.aris/installed-skills-codex.txt), then executes them using python3. This dynamic loading from computed paths could be exploited to run arbitrary code if the configuration files are manipulated.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Nov 10, 2026, 12:12 PM