result-to-claim
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses bash to perform complex operations, including retrieving logs from a remote server using SSH and processing configuration files with
awk. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Training logs and experiment metrics are gathered from multiple sources and sent to a secondary agent (
gpt-6-astra). This constitutes exposure of potentially sensitive research data to an external model. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from experiment logs and W&B history, interpolating it directly into a prompt for a secondary LLM.
- Ingestion points: Reads metrics from W&B API, local log files (
EXPERIMENT_LOG.md), and remote server logs via SSH. - Boundary markers: Uses simple headers in the prompt template but lacks explicit instructions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to bash, file writing, and network tools (via SSH).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the experiment data before it is sent to the evaluator agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill determines the location of auxiliary scripts (
evidence_check.pyandresearch_wiki.py) at runtime by inspecting environment variables (ARIS_REPO) and local configuration files (.aris/installed-skills-codex.txt), then executes them usingpython3. This dynamic loading from computed paths could be exploited to run arbitrary code if the configuration files are manipulated.
Audit Metadata