task
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted data from the local environment to generate task specifications.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the existing codebase for context ("Research codebase for context") and parses the
TASKS.mdfile to determine the next task ID. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit embedded instructions within the files it reads.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write to the filesystem (creating
docs/task/*.mdand updatingTASKS.md) and to spawn sub-agents (e.g.,/implement). - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any validation or sanitization logic for the content read from the codebase before it is interpolated into new task documents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated file system operations, including creating a directory structure (
docs/task/), creating new Markdown files, and programmatically updating theTASKS.mdtracking file. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external GitHub repository (
github.com/eljun/claude-skills) within its version display logic. While this specific instance is used for informational purposes, it points users to external code maintained outside of the primary vendor's infrastructure.
Audit Metadata