ad-delegation-attack
Fail
Audited by Snyk on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt repeatedly instructs embedding plaintext credentials, hashes, and tickets directly into commands and examples (e.g., /:, -password:P@ssw0rd123, FakePass, <BASE64_TGT>), which requires the agent to handle or emit secret values verbatim.
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). This is an explicit offensive playbook for Kerberos delegation abuse (unconstrained, constrained, RBCD) containing step‑by‑step commands and tooling to capture TGTs/credentials, configure AD attributes, create machine accounts, perform S4U attacks, DCSync and remote execution—i.e., clear instructions for credential theft, lateral movement and privilege escalation.
MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
- Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). Flagged because the skill provides explicit, step-by-step offensive actions that create machine accounts, modify Active Directory object attributes (RBCD), perform DCSync/ticket theft and other operations that change the state of target systems and can create accounts/resources (e.g., addcomputer.py, rbcd.py) — i.e. it instructs actions that modify system/domain state and enable compromise.
Issues (3)
W007
HIGHInsecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
E006
CRITICALMalicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
W013
MEDIUMAttempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
Audit Metadata