azure-ad-attack
Fail
Audited by Snyk on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes examples that embed plaintext passwords and tokens into command lines and Authorization headers (e.g., --password 'Spring2024!', -p 'password', curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN", client_secret/{new-secret}), which requires the agent to handle and output secret values verbatim, creating high exfiltration risk.
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). This content is an explicit attacker playbook: it provides step‑by‑step instructions for credential theft (password spraying, phishing), token/PRT extraction and replay, Service Principal/app secret/certificate backdoors (addPassword/addKey), admin‑consent phishing, role assignment escalation, Azure AD Connect/DCSync abuse, managed‑identity token misuse and other lateral‑movement/persistence techniques intended to enable unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The SKILL.md explicitly instructs runtime calls to external tenant/public endpoints (e.g., https://graph.microsoft.com and https://login.microsoftonline.com) to fetch user/app/servicePrincipal data and audit logs that the agent is expected to read and use to decide follow-up actions (enumeration, addPassword, role assignments), so untrusted third‑party content can materially influence behavior.
Issues (3)
W007
HIGHInsecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
E006
CRITICALMalicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
Audit Metadata