cloud-metadata
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to access sensitive internal cloud metadata endpoints (e.g.,
169.254.169.254,100.100.100.200, andmetadata.tencentyun.com) to harvest temporary IAM/CAM credentials and private instance information. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Provides procedures to read and configure sensitive files such as
~/.aws/credentialsand~/.cos.yamlwith harvested session tokens, enabling broader access to cloud environments. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Outlines the execution of multiple high-privilege shell commands using cloud CLI tools (
aws,tccli,coscli) to enumerate storage buckets, retrieve cloud functions, and list account users. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the
coscliutility from Tencent Cloud's official domain (cosbrowser.cloud.tencent.com) and applies executable permissions to the binary. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from external cloud metadata services (e.g.,
user-datascripts and security credential responses) which are controlled by the target cloud provider or potentially an attacker. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions are provided to distinguish or ignore commands that might be embedded within the ingested metadata responses.
- Capability inventory: Includes capabilities for shell command execution, cloud API interaction, and local file system modifications.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the metadata output before it is processed or used in subsequent shell commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata