gcp-exploit
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides explicit instructions and payloads to exfiltrate sensitive cloud credentials and access tokens to an external, non-whitelisted server (attacker.com).
- Evidence: Shell commands in
SKILL.md(Phase 3.2) andreferences/gcp-iam-privesc.md(Paths 7 and 10) explicitly usecurlto send stolen tokens and service account keys tohttps://attacker.com/exfil. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a large volume of instructions for executing administrative and offensive commands using
gcloud,gsutil, andkubectlto manipulate cloud infrastructure. - Evidence: Instructions for creating backdoor service account keys (
gcloud iam service-accounts keys create), modifying IAM policies to grant attacker access, and deploying malicious Cloud Functions or Compute instances to bypass security boundaries. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct the user to download and execute offensive security tools from third-party GitHub repositories that are not categorized as official cloud providers or trusted libraries.
- Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/GCP-IAM-Privilege-Escalation.gitfollowed by execution of Python scripts for automated privilege escalation scanning. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is structured as an "Attack Methodology," which could induce an AI agent to adopt an adversarial persona and potentially bypass safety guidelines when interacting with GCP environments.
- Evidence: The metadata utilizes MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1078.004, T1552.005, etc.) and provides a step-by-step roadmap for compromising production cloud resources.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata