gcp-pentesting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands for interacting with GCP, including instructions for injecting reverse shell payloads into Compute Engine startup scripts to gain remote access.
- Evidence found in
references/iam-privesc.md(Section 2.2) andreferences/post-exploit-persistence.md(Section 2.7). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions include specific methods for exfiltrating sensitive data such as OAuth tokens, database dumps, and Secret Manager keys to external attacker-controlled infrastructure.
- Evidence includes the use of
curlandgsutilto send data to placeholders likeATTACKER_SERVERandATTACKER_BUCKET. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill contains a dedicated reference guide documenting over 30 privilege escalation paths in GCP, focusing on the abuse of the
iam.serviceAccounts.actAspermission. - Detailed paths are provided in
references/iam-privesc.md. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill describes various techniques to maintain long-term access to a GCP project, such as creating permanent Service Account keys, modifying IAM policies to add backdoor accounts, and creating malicious scheduled tasks.
- Evidence found in
references/post-exploit-persistence.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends downloading and using several third-party security tools (e.g.,
gcpbucketbrute,ScoutSuite,gcpwn,Hayat) from external, unverified repositories. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation hardcodes a specific OAuth client secret (
ZmssLNjJy2998hD4CTg2ejr2) for use in credential generation commands. While this is a known public secret for the Google SDK, hardcoding such values remains a security risk.
Audit Metadata