k8s-container-escape
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands for interacting with internal system APIs and the host operating system.
- Evidence includes commands for environment recognition (e.g.,
cat /proc/1/cgroup), interacting with the Docker Socket (e.g.,curl -s --unix-socket /var/run/docker.sock), and querying Kubelet/API Server endpoints. - Complex command chains for cgroup release_agent exploitation and kernel vulnerability triggers are documented in
references/escape-techniques.md. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill documents multiple paths to escalate privileges from a container to host root access.
- Instructions for mounting host device filesystems (e.g.,
mount /dev/sda1 /tmp/hostroot) and usingchrootto gain host access are provided inSKILL.md. - Techniques for using
nsenterto escape to host namespaces (PID, Mount, Net) are detailed inreferences/escape-techniques.md. - Documented methods for exploiting RBAC permissions to create privileged pods or simulate high-privilege accounts (e.g.,
system:masters). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes methods for accessing and extracting sensitive credentials and system files.
- Instructions for stealing ServiceAccount tokens from
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token. - Commands for accessing cloud metadata services (e.g., AWS IMDS at
169.254.169.254) to retrieve IAM role credentials. - Techniques for reading sensitive host files like
/etc/shadowby hijacking pod log symlinks or direct filesystem mounting. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill describes techniques for maintaining long-term access within a compromised cluster.
- Documentation in
references/escape-techniques.mdon creating Static Pods by placing configuration files in/etc/kubernetes/manifests/, which are automatically maintained by the Kubelet. - Instructions for tampering with the
aws-authConfigMap in EKS to grant persistentcluster-adminaccess to external IAM roles. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external exploit code and security tools.
- A reference to a Proof-of-Concept for CVE-2019-5736 (runc escape) hosted on GitHub is provided in
references/escape-techniques.md. - Mentions of third-party security tools like CDK, PEIRATES, and kubeletctl for automated exploitation.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection through the processing of untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read external data such as Pod logs (
kubectl logs) and various K8s API responses inreferences/cluster-attacks.mdandreferences/rbac-and-api-abuse.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard potential commands embedded within the logs or API data it processes.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides access to powerful tools like
kubectl,curl, and host-level execution capabilities (nsenter,mount). - Sanitization: No evidence of data sanitization or validation is present before the agent processes or acts upon external information.
Audit Metadata