lfi-rfi-methodology
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local shell commands to perform security testing and exploitation tasks.
- Evidence includes instructions to use
curlfor interacting with targets and injecting payloads into logs (e.g.,curl -s "http://target/" -H "User-Agent: ..."). - It utilizes
python3 -cfor inline parameter fuzzing and scanning (e.g.,python3 -c "import requests;[...] requests.get(f'http://TARGET/...')"). - It employs specialized security tools like
ffuffor directory and parameter discovery. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and use external tools from third-party repositories.
- It directs the agent to clone the
php_filter_chain_generatorrepository from GitHub (https://github.com/synacktiv/php_filter_chain_generator.git) to generate RCE payloads. While the source is a recognized security research organization, it is an external dependency. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of interacting with untrusted external systems.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the outputs of
curl,requests.get, andffufwhen scanning or reading files from external targets (e.g., readingaccess.logoretc/passwd). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to use delimiters or sanitization when the agent processes the output of these commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities including shell access (
curl,python3,git,ssh) and file system operations, which could be abused if the agent interprets instructions embedded in the target's data. - Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms to sanitize or filter the content retrieved from external targets before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata