ssti-methodology

Fail

Audited by Socket on Apr 22, 2026

4 alerts found:

Securityx2Malwarex2
SecurityMEDIUM
evals/evals.json

This “code” is an embedded attack playbook for SSTI exploitation: it instructs engine fingerprinting, blacklist/sandbox bypass, and provides guidance to achieve RCE and extract flags/secrets. It contains no operational malware by itself, but its purpose is clearly weaponized and could materially enable compromise of vulnerable services if distributed/used in a supply chain.

Confidence: 86%Severity: 93%
SecurityMEDIUM
SKILL.md

SUSPICIOUS/HIGH-RISK skill. Its stated purpose and behavior are internally consistent, but the purpose itself is offensive: it equips an AI agent to probe for SSTI and escalate to file reads and remote command execution on targets. There is little supply-chain risk in the provided text, but the exploit enablement makes the overall skill high risk.

Confidence: 91%Severity: 84%
MalwareHIGH
references/other-engines-and-bypass.md

This fragment is an offensive SSTI exploit and filter-bypass guide across multiple template engines. It explicitly documents chains to achieve OS command execution (RCE), read sensitive files, and exfiltrate secrets/configuration via template rendering. If such content is packaged in an open-source dependency, it is a serious supply-chain security indicator and should be treated as high risk pending removal/review and investigation of how it is distributed/triggered within the package.

Confidence: 70%Severity: 90%
MalwareHIGH
references/jinja2-exploitation.md

This fragment is a high-risk, explicit exploit guide for Jinja2 SSTI enabling information disclosure and remote command execution. It documents multiple reliable exploitation patterns (direct context disclosure, subclass-based file reads, and __globals__ -> os -> popen/Popen RCE). Any application that renders untrusted templates without strict sandboxing, filters, or careful context exposure is vulnerable to the techniques shown. Treat the content as actionable malicious guidance — remediate by disallowing user-controlled templates, using Jinja2 sandboxing, removing sensitive objects from template context, and employing input validation/templating policies.

Confidence: 90%Severity: 95%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Apr 22, 2026, 10:11 AM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/wgpsec%2FAboutSecurity%2Fssti-methodology%2F@d86c6174755abfecdab5394baa20d3f24313e2c2