RedBookSkills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from an external platform (Xiaohongshu) through several functions.
- Ingestion points: The
search_feeds,get_feed_detail, andget_notification_mentionsfunctions inscripts/cdp_publish.pyextract content (notes, comments, and notifications) directly from the web page state and API responses. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the scraped content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant local capabilities, including file writing (
_write_content_data_csv), media downloading (image_downloader.py), and browser automation control. - Sanitization: While the skill uses
json.dumpsto escape content before injecting it into JavaScript execution contexts, it does not sanitize the content before presenting it to the agent for decision-making (e.g., replying to comments). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local commands to manage the browser environment.
- Evidence:
scripts/chrome_launcher.pyusessubprocess.Popento launch the Google Chrome process with specific debugging flags (--remote-debugging-port). This is a legitimate requirement for CDP-based automation but represents a privileged capability. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The core automation logic relies on executing dynamic code within the browser context.
- Evidence:
scripts/cdp_publish.pyandscripts/feed_explorer.pyuse theRuntime.evaluateCDP command extensively to execute JavaScript snippets for DOM interaction, data extraction, and UI manipulation. The skill's own internal audit (docs/code-review-2026-03-07.md) notes that_fill_contentusesinnerHTMLfor text injection, which could lead to unintended HTML parsing if the input contains special characters.
Audit Metadata