section-logic-polisher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to process data from external files (
outline/subsection_briefs.jsonlandoutline/writer_context_packs.jsonl) to update section content. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in these source files could manipulate the agent's edits or behavior. - Ingestion points:
outline/subsection_briefs.jsonlandoutline/writer_context_packs.jsonl(referenced in the Inputs section of SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None described in the instructions to separate untrusted data from processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to update existing markdown files in the
sections/directory (referenced in the Workflow section of SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No specific validation or sanitization process for the ingested external content is mentioned.
Audit Metadata