ClawTeam Multi-Agent Coordination
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
clawteam spawncommand enables the execution of arbitrary shell commands as sub-agents (e.g.,clawteam spawn tmux [COMMAND]). This allows for the dynamic creation of processes that may execute user-provided or untrusted inputs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the use of the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag by default when spawning agents. This explicitly removes security boundaries, allowing agents to perform potentially sensitive operations without human-in-the-loop approval. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The identity management workflow recommends the use of
eval $(clawteam identity set ...)inreferences/workflows.md, which executes shell code generated by the CLI tool. This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the tool's output is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its messaging and task management systems.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
clawteam inbox receiveandclawteam task list(documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/cli-reference.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are documented for delimiting external message or task data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to spawn new processes (
clawteam spawn), update task states, and manage system files in~/.clawteam/. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of message or task content is provided before it is processed by the recipient agent.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture is designed for the distributed execution of commands across multiple processes, which represents a coordinated platform for code execution.
Audit Metadata