ClawTeam Multi-Agent Coordination

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The clawteam spawn command enables the execution of arbitrary shell commands as sub-agents (e.g., clawteam spawn tmux [COMMAND]). This allows for the dynamic creation of processes that may execute user-provided or untrusted inputs.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the use of the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag by default when spawning agents. This explicitly removes security boundaries, allowing agents to perform potentially sensitive operations without human-in-the-loop approval.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The identity management workflow recommends the use of eval $(clawteam identity set ...) in references/workflows.md, which executes shell code generated by the CLI tool. This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the tool's output is compromised.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through its messaging and task management systems.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via clawteam inbox receive and clawteam task list (documented in SKILL.md and references/cli-reference.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are documented for delimiting external message or task data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to spawn new processes (clawteam spawn), update task states, and manage system files in ~/.clawteam/.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of message or task content is provided before it is processed by the recipient agent.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's architecture is designed for the distributed execution of commands across multiple processes, which represents a coordinated platform for code execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 2, 2026, 08:28 AM