skill-benchmark
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes sub-sessions using
claude -pwith the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag inSKILL.mdandagents/runner.md. This bypasses the platform's standard requirement for human approval of tool use, allowing the sub-agent to perform file operations and shell commands autonomously. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
agents/runner.md, the skill explicitly unsets protection environment variables (env -u CLAUDECODE -u CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT) to bypass restrictions intended to prevent infinite agent recursion and uncontrolled execution chains. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/run_checks.pyscript usessubprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)to execute arbitrary shell commands extracted from theruns_without_errorsection of benchmark task markdown files. This creates a significant execution surface for arbitrary commands if the task definition files are manipulated or incorrectly generated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes a system prompt append technique (
--append-system-prompt) inagents/runner.mdto force sub-sessions to load the skill under test. While intended for methodology consistency, the specific instruction pattern used ('IMPORTANT: Before starting any work, you MUST...') mimics common prompt injection override tactics. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect injection because it reads and analyzes the full content of external
SKILL.mdfiles to generate its own benchmarking tasks. - Ingestion points: In
SKILL.mdStep 2, the agent reads the complete target skill file to extract domains and capabilities. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing the target skill's content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(read/write/execute),Agenttool (launching graders), and the ability to run unrestricted sub-sessions viaclaude -p. - Sanitization: The skill does not sanitize or validate instructions extracted from the target skill before using them to auto-generate tasks, potentially allowing a malicious skill to influence the benchmark generator.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The benchmarking process involves dynamic generation of task files in Step 3 which are then processed by execution and grading scripts, creating multiple points where instructions from data are converted into executable actions.
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