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Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides bash code snippets in
SKILL.md(Step 3) for the agent to execute. These snippets usecurlto send data to an API, interpolating variables like${PROMPT}(which contains user-provided book titles and author names) directly into a shell string. Without proper sanitization or escaping of these inputs, special characters could be used to break out of the JSON structure or the shell command itself, leading to arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to perform network requests to an external API (defaulting to
api.openai.com) usingcurl. It also allows the user to override theGPT_IMAGE_BASE_URLvia environment variables. This capability could be leveraged to redirect sensitive data, such as theGPT_IMAGE_API_KEYand prompt content, to an untrusted external server. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input (book titles, author names, and descriptions) and interpolates them into instructions for an image generation model. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a user could provide a title designed to override the agent's formatting instructions or influence the model's behavior beyond the intended scope.
- Ingestion points: Ingests '书名' (Book Title) and '作者名' (Author Name) from the user in
SKILL.md(Step 1). - Boundary markers: None; the input is directly placed inside a multi-layered template (prompt string → JSON body → shell command).
- Capability inventory: Performs network requests via
curland file system operations viamkdir,jq, andbase64inSKILL.md(Step 3). - Sanitization: No instructions or mechanisms are provided to validate or escape user input before it is used in executable commands.
Audit Metadata