uv-package-manager
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download installation scripts from
astral.shandgithub.com/astral-sh/uv. These are the official domains and repositories for the Astral organization, which develops the uv tool. These references are documented neutrally as they originate from a well-known service provider. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation includes commands that download and immediately execute remote scripts, such as
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shand the PowerShell equivalent usingiex. While these patterns involve remote code execution, they are the standard, documented installation methods for the tool and target the official vendor infrastructure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it instructions the agent to process potentially untrusted data from external files such as
requirements.txtandpyproject.toml. - Ingestion points: Files are ingested via commands like
uv add -r requirements.txtanduv sync(which readspyproject.toml) as seen inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None are present; the tool processes the files according to standard package manager logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform network operations (package installation), write to the file system (
uv init,uv lock), and execute arbitrary code viauv runas documented in bothSKILL.mdandreferences/advanced-patterns.md. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of the input file content; the skill relies on the underlying tool's resolution and validation mechanisms.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata