by-harness

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script scripts/update_runtime.py is configured to fetch a version manifest and various project files, including Python and Shell scripts, from a remote GitHub repository (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xmzDesign/santong-skill). This behavior is enabled by default in the update-policy.json configuration.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The update mechanism downloads executable content and overwrites local scripts in .harness/scripts/ and automated hooks in .claude/hooks/ and .codex/hooks/. These scripts are subsequently executed by the agent environment to enforce project workflows and coding conventions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple Python scripts, including scripts/ensure_task_branch.py and scripts/task_switch.py, use the subprocess module to execute system commands for Git repository state tracking and for running other local Python scripts.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from task description files (.harness/task-harness/features/*.json) which are interpolated into the agent's context. There is a potential surface for indirect prompt injection as these descriptions can influence the agent's behavior during the 'Plan' and 'Build' phases without rigorous sanitization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 9, 2026, 05:46 AM