by-harness
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/update_runtime.pyis configured to fetch a version manifest and various project files, including Python and Shell scripts, from a remote GitHub repository (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xmzDesign/santong-skill). This behavior is enabled by default in theupdate-policy.jsonconfiguration. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The update mechanism downloads executable content and overwrites local scripts in
.harness/scripts/and automated hooks in.claude/hooks/and.codex/hooks/. These scripts are subsequently executed by the agent environment to enforce project workflows and coding conventions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple Python scripts, including
scripts/ensure_task_branch.pyandscripts/task_switch.py, use thesubprocessmodule to execute system commands for Git repository state tracking and for running other local Python scripts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from task description files (
.harness/task-harness/features/*.json) which are interpolated into the agent's context. There is a potential surface for indirect prompt injection as these descriptions can influence the agent's behavior during the 'Plan' and 'Build' phases without rigorous sanitization.
Audit Metadata